

### Remarks

Claims 1-13 have previously been withdrawn. Claims 14-23 and 25-30 are being cancelled by this amendment and claim 24 has previously been cancelled. Claims 31-49 are being added by this amendment. Claims 31-49 are supported by the specification in general and, more specifically, by at least pages 2-3 and 9-10 of the specification as filed with this application. As such, Applicant believes that no new matter has been added by these amendments. Thus, claims 31-49 are now pending in this application.

#### Claims Rejection – 35 U.S.C. § 102(e)

Claims 14-30 were rejected in the Office Action dated June 20, 2005, as being clearly anticipated by Kelly *et al.*, U.S. Patent No. 6,293,865 (“Kelly”). Though Applicant does not agree that Kelly anticipates claims 14-30, claims 14-30 have been cancelled by this amendment and as such this rejection is moot. In addition, claims 31-49 include the limitation that the game devices be grouped into a plurality of location-based groups, where each of the plurality of location-based groups consists of one or more defined geographic locations of the plurality of game devices. Kelly in no way anticipates or discloses such a feature and as such claims 31-49 are allowable.

#### Claims Rejection – 35 U.S.C. § 103

Claims 14-30 have been previously rejected under 34 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Walker *et al.*, U.S. Patent No. 5,779,549 (“Walker”), in view of Moody, U.S. Pub. No. 2002/0093136 (“Moody”). Claims 14-30 have been cancelled by this amendment and as such this rejection is moot.

An obviousness rejection under §103 requires that all the limitations of a claim must be taught or suggested by the prior art. M.P.E.P. § 2143.03 (citing *In re Royka*, 490 F.2d 981, 985, 180 U.S.P.Q. 580, 583 (C.C.P.A. 1974)). A *prima facie* case of obviousness, *inter alia*, requires:

(i) a “suggestion or motivation, either in the references themselves or in the knowledge generally available to one of ordinary skill in the art, to modify the reference or to combine reference teachings,” and

(ii) that “the prior art reference[s] . . . must teach or suggest all the claim limitations.” See M.P.E.P. § 2143 (citing *In re Vaeck*, 947 F.2d 488, 493, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d 1438, 1442 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).

As stated in the Office Action dated April 23, 2004, Walker discloses a system 100 for providing tournaments among players of games devices. There are a plurality of gaming devices 104,106

identified as personal computers. The gaming devices are adapted for communication over a network 108. The gaming devices communicate to at least one server 102, the server having access to databases that store player information and information pertaining to a gaming tournament. *See, e.g.,* col. 5, lls. 32-40.

Moody discloses a method for operating an **individual** gaming machine by a casino. *See* Moody at ¶¶ 3, 7, 11, 13, 15, 22-23, 29, 42, 53-56, *etc.* The gaming machines in Moody are stand-alone machines and are not linked with other machines.

Neither Walker, Moody, nor the combination thereof discloses, teaches, or suggests the Applicant's claimed invention. Walker does not teach or suggest grouping the game devices into a plurality of location-based groups, where each of the plurality of location-based groups consists of one or more defined geographic locations of the plurality of game devices. In fact, Walker does not suggest in any way determining or defining the location, especially the geographic location, of a gaming device as specifically claimed by the Applicant in claims 31-49.

These deficiencies are not overcome by combining the wagering games of Moody with Walker's games. Moody fails to disclose, teach, or suggest grouping devices in any way whatsoever. Moody, more particularly, fails to describe grouping the devices based on their geographic locations, as specifically claimed by Applicant in claims 31-49.

Applicant agrees with the Examiner that one cannot show nonobviousness by attacking references individually when the rejections are based on combinations of the reference. However, in this case, the Applicant has attacked the combination of the references by showing that neither of the individual references discloses grouping based on one or more defined geographic locations. Because neither Walker nor Moody discloses location based grouping, the combination thereof cannot possibly disclose this feature.

In the Office Action dated June 20, 2005, the Examiner states that Walker discloses "pay a fee, play a game and get a prize" and that "based on location, is where the equipment is located, because the Applicant fails to further define a location." The Examiner's broad definition of what Walker discloses is not justified by the Walker reference itself. Nowhere, does Walker discuss or even mention determining or identifying where a gaming device is located. While it is obviously true that there must be physical devices located *somewhere* to conduct the tournaments of Walker, the geographical location of the physical devices is in no way discussed or utilized within the Walker reference. Further, does the

Examiner mean where the central controller is located, where the game devices themselves are located, or where another physical portion of the distributed electronic tournament system resides? Walker provides no assistance in determining what the Examiner means by this statement because Walker does not discuss geographic locations in any way. Alternatively, Applicant specifically claims grouping the devices based on the geographic locations of the gaming devices themselves.

Claims 31-49 require that the game devices be grouped into a plurality of location-based groups, each of the plurality of location-based groups consisting of one or more defined geographic locations. This limitation is in no way met by the combination of Walker and Moody. Further, this limitation is not obvious even if the Examiner attempts to combine the teachings of Kelly with those of Walker and Moody because none of the references individually or in combination disclose such a feature. Therefore, the Applicant respectfully requests that the Examiner allow the pending claims to proceed towards issuance.


Conclusion

In view of the above remarks, Applicant believes the pending application is in condition for allowance. If there are any matters which may be resolved or clarified through a telephone interview, the Examiner is requested to contact the undersigned attorney at the number indicated. Applicants believe that no fee is due with respect to this Amendment and Response (aside from the enclosed one-month petition fee), however, should any additional fees be required (except for payment of the issue fee), the Commissioner is authorized to deduct the fees from Jenkins & Gilchrist, P.C. Deposit Account No. 10-0447, Order No. 47089-00040. A duplicate copy of this Amendment and Response is enclosed for that purpose.

Respectfully submitted,

Date: October 20, 2005

By



Daniel J. Burnham

Reg. No. 39,618

**Jenkins & Gilchrist, P.C.**

225 West Washington Street, Suite 2600

Chicago, Illinois 60606-3418

Attorney for Applicant

Telephone: (312) 425-8513